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THE 2011 BERNSTEIN LECTURE AT
ST. JOHN’S UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
HON. PAUL A. CROTTY†
Good afternoon. I am glad to be here at St. John’s. I want to
thank Professor Cavanagh for the invitation and for helping me
prepare. As always, his comments were insightful and helpful.
Lewis Bernstein served his country in war and in peace. For
thirty years, he headed the Special Litigation Unit at the
Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. Chief among his
cases were the IBM case and the broad spectrum antibiotic drug
cases. The tenor of his work is celebrated by his co-workers and
acolytes who learned from the master. He is the embodiment of
the wisdom that public service, when done well and honestly, is
the noblest of all professions.
I am honored to receive this award and humbled by it. Yet, I
am bold enough to try to add my thoughts to the Bernstein
Lectures, which have shed so much illumination on the
intricacies of our antitrust laws.
I do not want to slight any of the distinguished graduates of
St. John’s by not mentioning them, but I would be remiss if I did
not mention Hugh Leo Carey, who graduated from St. John’s
Law School, and became the man who saved New York. He was
succeeded in the Governor’s seat by another great man, Mario M.
Cuomo. For two decades, from 1974 to 1994, our state was
blessed with leaders who recognized the common good and were
dedicated to achieving it. They were inspired leaders, and St.
John’s Law School proudly claims them as its graduates.

†
Paul A. Crotty has served as a United States District Judge for the Southern
District of New York since August 1, 2005. He served as Corporation Counsel for
Mayor Giuliani (1994–1997) and previously served as Commissioner of the Office of
Financial Services; Commissioner of Finance; and Commissioner of Housing,
Preservation and Development (1984–1988) for Mayor Koch. He practiced law with
Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine (1969–1984; 1988–1993); and was also Group
President for New York and Connecticut at Verizon, Inc. (1997–2005).
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My mentor when I first started to practice, and continuing
until he passed away in 1998, was Owen McGivern. He was a
member of the State Assembly; a Naval Officer, who fought with
the O.S.S. during World War II; a Judge on the Court of General
Sessions and Supreme Court; and, eventually, Presiding Justice
of the First Department of the Appellate Division. Judge
McGivern was not the only great judge St. John’s Law School can
be proud of: Judge on the New York Court of Appeals and Dean
Emeritus of the Law School, Joseph Bellacosa; Judge Carmen
Ciparick on the New York Court of Appeals; Ray Dearie, who just
stepped down as Chief Judge in the Eastern District of New
York; and, in the Southern District, the late John Sprizzo, and P.
Kevin Castel, who presides with great intelligence and a firm
grasp on reality. It is an honor to serve with Judge Castel.
Other alumni include, Bob McGuire, our former Police
Commissioner; Charles “Joe” Hynes, the Brooklyn District
Attorney; and Congressman Charles Rangel. They embody the
very best in public service.
I want to talk about antitrust law and motions for summary
judgment, but it will be helpful to put these two matters in
context with what we do in federal courts throughout the United
States.
The United States Courts are established by Article III of the
Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789.1 We play an
important role in American society, but to be fair, most citizens
do not have a firm grip on what we do. Too often, the response to
a court decision is “well, who gave him or her that power?” or
“who is she or he to do something like that?” As a matter of fact,
Mr. Justice Breyer’s recent book, Making Our Democracy Work,2
tries to explain how and why the public accepts a judicial
pronouncement as legitimate, or rejects it as illegitimate.
It is important for the bar, and for judges, to maintain the
public’s confidence in how the courts work in interpreting the
Constitution, applying statutory law, and deciding cases—civil
and criminal—that come before us. How do we do that? We
must retain our independence, and there must be transparency
to the working of the courts, fairness in the process, and justice
in the result.
1

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
See generally STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S
VIEW (2010).
2
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Much of our work involves issues of constitutional
dimensions. The issues arise everyday, mostly in criminal law:
Was a search unreasonable; was a confession truly voluntary; did
the defendant have effective assistance of counsel?
How do you balance the right to assemble with the need for
public order and safety? Much more of our work requires
statutory analysis and statutory application in patents,
trademarks, copyrights, and securities law cases.
Of course, litigants and the courts have a need for speed, for
efficiency, and for a just result, with the lowest transaction costs.
We must be conscious of the world in which we live. The world is
shrinking; we are now a global economy. While you will find
English to be the primary language of the global economy, not
everyone believes that the Anglo-American method of disposing
of civil disputes is their cup of tea. It is expensive, takes too long,
and is unpredictable.
A businessman in Japan, or in China, or even in
Kazakhstan, could ask: Why do you take twelve people, who
know nothing of the dispute, and probably nothing about
business, and then entrust them with a decision that determines
questions involving millions of dollars?
The American answer is that jury trials are the critical
ingredient in disposing of the business that comes before us.
When you read the Declaration of Independence, you will note
that the far greater portion of the document deals with a listing
of grievances, which Jefferson said, had to be “submitted to a
candid world,”3 as the justification for separation and
independence. Many of the grievances dealt with how judges
were selected and how colonial juries were avoided. The colonists
wanted to participate in the governance of their communities,
and juries were a vital part of that participation. When “We the
People” adopted the Constitution a decade later, the right to a
jury trial was embedded in Article III. But that was deemed
insufficient. The state ratification conventions demonstrated a
continuing concern that juries always be available to resolve
disputes.
Juries are featured in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth
Amendments, and, especially, the Seventh Amendment of the
Bill of Rights.

3

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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Juries are not going away; the plain fact is that the
overwhelming majority of cases are not disposed of by juries, but
by settlement or disposition by way of judicial order. Indeed,
very few civil cases, less than two percent, go to trial. Today, I
want to discuss antitrust law and the granting of summary
judgment.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern all court actions
in United States District Courts. The goal of the rules is “to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.”4 The rules follow the order of litigation
and begin with how to commence an action, serve papers, move
to dismiss, engage in discovery, proceed with trial, and end with
judgments.
We are going to focus on Rule 56 dealing with summary
judgment.
Summary judgment is applicable to claims made by plaintiff
and defenses raised by defendant. The movant is required to
show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”5
Rule 56 requires the court to “state on the record the reasons for
granting or denying the motion.”6
As you will see, this requirement is important to a judge. He
or she can easily state that the motion is denied; there is a
genuine dispute as to material facts.
The material facts in dispute do not have to be specified. A
decision like this is virtually bullet proof; it is not final, and
hence, not reviewable.
On the other hand, higher courts
reviewing a grant of summary judgment would not accept an
order which states in words or substance: “The Court has
reviewed the parties’ submissions and after due consideration it
has determined there are no genuine disputes as to any material
facts. Accordingly, judgment will be entered for plaintiff.” That
clearly does not fly.
From a judicial viewpoint, granting a motion for summary
judgment requires a careful review of the facts, as well as a
careful consideration of the law. It may take the judge days
indeed weeks to carefully review an extensive record to resolve

4
5
6

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
Id. at 56(a).
Id.

FINAL_CROTTY

2013]

12/11/2013 3:31 PM

THE 2011 BERNSTEIN LECTURE

111

the issues. The question arises: Is it worth the time to go
through the exercise, or is it simpler for the judge to set the
matter down for trial?
As you can tell from my short précis of the rules, a plaintiff
does not file a complaint and immediately report to the
defendant’s cashier’s window. The pleadings can be tested by
motions addressed to their sufficiency and adequacy.
In days of yore, motions to dismiss were not granted, except
in rare cases. This was due to the standard for assessing the
adequacy of the pleadings. Rule 8 required three things: (1) a
statement of the basis for jurisdiction; (2) “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief”; and (3) a demand for relief.7 Conley v. Gibson,8 decided in
1957, set forth the pleading standard for the next fifty years.
Plaintiff must give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests. If you wish to get an idea of
how things used to be, and still are for some types of claims, read
the forms which, incidentally, have not changed.
The following is all you have to allege on a complaint form:
(1) (Statement of jurisdiction); (2) On (Date) at (Place), defendant
negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff; (3) As a
result, promptly was physically injured, lost wages or income,
suffered physical and mental pain, and incurred medical
expenses of $__________.9
In a commercial loan transaction, the requirements are just
as brief in Form 10: (1) Jurisdiction; (2) On (Date), the defendant
executed and delivered a note promising to pay the plaintiff on
(Date) the sum of $__________ with interest at the rate of ____%.
A copy of the note is attached; (3) Defendant has not paid the
amount owed.10
There is an evolving standard in complex cases. And not to
disclose too much of my talk too soon; I will tell you that there
used to be close to a special set of rules for summary judgment in
antitrust cases. That is gone now. Summary judgment is as
available in antitrust cases as it is in any kind of case. The net

7

Id. at 8(a).
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), overruled in part by Bell Atl. Corp v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
9
FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11.
10
FED. R. CIV. P. Form 10.
8
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effect for antitrust cases is that it is tougher to plead a viable
antitrust claim and easier to obtain summary judgment on an
antitrust action.
Let us spend a moment on the evolution of pleading
requirements.
On a motion to dismiss, the facts are assumed to be true and
all favorable inferences are drawn in favor of the opponent of the
motion to dismiss. As I said not too long ago, all the complaint
had to do was put the defendant on notice and then we were off
on discovery, perhaps slowed down by an occasional motion for a
more definite statement.
Discovery was readily available on most every claim. Some
of the claims are absurd on their face. For example, people
complaining of receiving negative messages from the CIA on the
fillings in their molars. And the worst is, in some of these cases,
the plaintiff has paid the filing fee. That means the complaint
does not have to meet the standards for in forma pauperis
complaints—frivolous and malicious claims may not be brought
in forma pauperis.11
The standard for dismissal at least as set forth in Conley was
that claims were not to be dismissed “unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.”12
But after fifty years, Conley was interred or at least put into
intensive care—the Almighty’s departure lounge. The Supreme
Court has advised us that Conley is “best forgotten as an
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard.”13
Now, in complex cases, you cannot plead “labels or
conclusions”; “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.”14 Instead, the factual allegations must be
sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.
The complaint must demonstrate that the claim for relief is not
just possible, but rather, plausible.15

11
12
13
14
15

28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2006).
Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007).
Id. at 555.
Id.
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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly dealt with the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.16 In order to gain access to the
long distance market, the local telephone monopoly had to open
up its local market to competition. Twombly was a phone
subscriber who claimed to want better service. He alleged that
phone companies—also known as the Baby Bells or the
incumbent local exchange carriers (“ILECs”)—engaged in a
conspiracy (1) to inhibit the growth of competitive local exchange
carriers (“CLECs”) and (2) to refrain from competing against one
another in contiguous markets—one CEO said competing in one
another’s ILEC territory did not seem right.17
At the heart of the Twombly complaint is that the Baby Bells
or the ILECs engaged in parallel conduct, or matching behavior.
There was no allegation of actual agreement among the Baby
Bells, although an agreement by inference was asserted.
The allegation of parallel conduct was not sufficient because
the parallel conduct, when viewed in light of common economic
experience, did not amount to an agreement. Rather than illegal
conduct based on an agreement by inference, which plaintiffs
alleged, the natural, unilateral action of each individual company
was intent on preserving its regional dominance. As to the
decision of each ILEC not to enter another ILEC’s territory,
certainly there was parallel conduct, but not a conspiracy, “if
history teaches anything.” The ILECs were born into a world of
monopoly and were used to sitting tight and expecting their
monopolist neighbor to do the same. Remember, in antitrust
there is no duty to aid competitors, as stated in Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP.18
The Supreme Court denied it was creating a heightened
pleading standard of requiring specific facts. Rather, the Court
was requiring only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.
Plausibility had to take on the
requirements of the antitrust law where parallel conduct is not
sufficient to demonstrate a conspiracy.

16

Id. at 549.
Id. at 550–51. You should not conclude that CLECs were simply upstarts. The
largest CLEC was AT&T which was intent on preserving its exclusive position in the
long distance market. Other CLECs were Time Warner and Cablevision, large
companies that sought to expand their exclusive franchise in the cable market.
18
540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004).
17
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So now, except in run-of-the-mill cases, and certainly in
antitrust cases and securities cases, you have the requirement to
allege facts sufficient to show plausibility before you are entitled
to get discovery on your claim.
What justified this sea change in pleading for antitrust and
other complex cases? The Court offered its own explanation:
Antitrust discovery can be expensive. So, it is a cautionary rule:
Before cost is imposed, let us be sure we have a claim that has a
plausible chance of prevailing. The proposed class in Twombly
had ninety percent of all customers and dealt with an unusual
variety of antitrust violations which occurred over a seven year
period. It would have been a case with high discovery costs.
The traditional answer that the wheat would be separated
from the chaff without undue expense and time by a wily judge’s
following the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for discovery and
the Manual for Complex Litigation was not a satisfactory
answer. Indeed, experience has demonstrated, it is a vain hope.
So now we know that you have to allege enough facts so that
a pleading is nudged from the speculative to the plausible. Does
that mean the plaintiff can report to the defendant’s cashier’s
window? The answer is not quite yet.
In most cases involving summary judgment, there has been
discovery where documents have been produced, depositions
taken, affidavits filed, and issues have been fully explored. But,
there is nothing in the rules that restrict a summary judgment
motion to a post-discovery environment. It can be brought in
much sooner, and Rule 12(d) provides a mechanism for
conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion to a motion for
summary judgment where “matters outside the pleadings are
presented to . . . the court.”19
Summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56, provides for the
prompt disposition of a case in which there are no genuine issues
as to any material fact or in which only a question of law is
involved.
By addressing assertions of unwarranted claims, or getting
rid of sham defenses, summary judgment allows the parties to
get expedited justice and some pressure on court dockets is
relieved. Even if only partial summary judgment on a claim or

19

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).
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defense is granted, that may very well save trial time by
removing a claim or defense. It may also contribute to the
settlement of the action.
Expedition and efficiency are important, but the chief
requirement is that justice be done. Nonetheless, if matters can
be expedited, and unnecessary trials avoided—for example, there
are no genuine issues of material facts which have been raised—
there is no good reason to deny a motion for summary judgment.
Now, what is the difference between a Rule 12 and Rule 56
motion? It is a subtle distinction which eludes the general
public, law students, and sometimes professors and their
students. Judges have to be included too!
Rule 12 motions address the sufficiency of the pleadings, not
whether there is an actual claim that is meritorious. The
question is does a claim exist as alleged in the complaint looking
only at the complaint?
Summary judgment is usually based on far more than the
pleadings—affidavits, depositions, and documents—the fruits of
discovery. Considering all of them together, the moving party
argues, that given the state of the record, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact, and, accordingly, the moving party
is entitled to judgment on the merits as a matter of law.
One of the reasons for the lack of clarity in distinguishing
between Rule 12 and Rule 56 motions is the way in which judges
handle these motions.
Remember Rule 1—judges should interpret the rules to
effect the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination and
resolution of every action. If you can get rid of a case or a
defense, does it make any difference how the motion and route to
a decision is denominated? To paraphrase Shakespeare, can’t a
rose by any other name be just as sweet?
The following are some distinctions which might be helpful.
First, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is addressed to the face of the
complaint. Second, a Rule 12(c) motion is restricted to the
contents of the pleadings as supplemented by certain facts
outside the pleadings. Third, a Rule 56 motion, testing whether
any genuine issue of material fact is present for a claim or a
defense, is based on a fuller record of facts.

FINAL_CROTTY

116

12/11/2013 3:31 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:107

The timing is another key indicator. Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c)
motions are typically made at the commencement of the
proceeding. And Rule 56 motions are normally made postdiscovery.
Unlike the Criminal Rules which contemplate one “omnibus”
motion, keep in mind that the Civil Rules allow “seriatim”
motions. If you make a Rule 12(b) motion, after discovery you
can move for summary judgment under Rule 56; and if the initial
Rule 56 motion is denied because there is an issue, for example,
of credibility, a party can still move under Rule 50 for a directed
verdict on the same issue on which summary judgment was
denied.
Remember that partial summary judgment and denials of
summary judgment are not final orders and may not be appealed.
I want to say a word here about the right to a jury trial.
Notwithstanding that fewer and fewer cases go to trial, much of
the literature and scholarship on Rule 12 and Rule 56 must be
analyzed from the perspective of the constitutional preference for
jury trials.
In a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the facts as alleged are
presumed to be true, and all inferences favorable to the pleadings
must be drawn. On that basis, we test the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. The bias is towards preserving the claim so that it
may be adjudicated at trial.
Similarly, when considering an issue on summary judgment,
the district court must read the record in the light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion. The opposing party gets the
benefit of the doubt.
This thumb on the scales of justice can be understood only in
light of our respect for the right to a jury trial. That right cannot
be denied, unless the court is satisfied that there is no cognizable
claim. There is no genuine issue of material fact.
Let’s continue our discussion of the requirements of a good
motion for summary judgment.
The movant is entitled to file affidavits in support of the
motion. The movant wants to demonstrate that upon due
consideration of the merits of the dispute, the moving party is
entitled to judgment. While the rules do not require that
affidavits be submitted in response, the plain fact is that the nonmoving party must file papers in response. While the rules
specify the times for making the required responses, many judges
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allow the parties to set their own schedule. I know that I do as a
matter both of courtesy and practicality. The slightly longer
periods I allow produce hopefully better, more succinct, concise,
and focused papers.
A motion for summary judgment is perhaps more urgent
than a motion to dismiss, although I do not mean to suggest that
a motion to dismiss should be taken lightly. Motions to dismiss,
however, are frequently accompanied by leave to replead. Circuit
courts look on this form of relief as appropriate. While the
pleading cycle cannot be endless, motions denying leave to
replead are closely scrutinized on appeal. A district court judge
had better have a good reason for denying leave to replead.
With summary judgment, there is no second chance. The
pleadings state a claim; but now the facts are in if there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the claim or defense cannot be
established, then judgment is entered and the case is ended.
There is no leave to replead.
Local Rule 56.120 here in the Southern and Eastern Districts
of New York elaborates on Rule 56’s procedural requirements
and aims to highlight the material facts as to which there are no
genuine issues. The paragraphs have to be supported by
citations to specific evidence—for example, depositions,
documents, affidavits.
But the practice with regard to Rule 56 has not been helpful.
The Southern District of New York has recently adopted pilot
rules for case management techniques for complex civil cases.21
Antitrust cases are defined as complex, and so are subject to
these new pilot rules.
You will be interested to learn that in the Southern District
of New York, the busiest and most active court in the federal
system, is not exactly overwhelmed by antitrust cases. In 2009,
forty-nine antitrust cases were filed, in 2010, fify-two, and this
year through the end of August, forty-one.
20

E.D.N.Y. R. 56.1; S.D.N.Y. R. 56.1.
See generally Project Pilot Hopes To Tame Complex Civil Cases, THE THIRD
BRANCH (Dec. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/11-12-01/Pilot_
Project_Hopes_to_Tame_Complex_Civil_Cases.aspx; see REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
IMPROVEMENTS COMMITTEE: PILOT PROJECT REGARDING CASE MANAGEMENT
TECHNIQUES FOR COMPLEX CIVIL CASES 1–14 (Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/Ta
b%20VI%20Appendix%20F%20SDNY%20Pilot%20Project%20for%20Complex%20Li
tigation.pdf.
21
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In contrast, intellectual property cases—patent and
trademark cases—are far higher by a multiple of eight—more
than 400. Securities and commodities cases are four to five times
higher—200 to 250.
In any event, for these complex cases, 56.1 statements are no
longer mandatory and do not need to be filed if the parties so
request and the court approves. But if the court requires 56.1
statements, they may not exceed twenty pages per party.
Let me interpret this for you. Local Rule 56.1 statements
can be useful, if they are short and concise. Their utility to the
court diminishes with volume. It is not a case of the more the
merrier, it is the opposite: The more there is, the less help.
Concision counts and it is the most effective way to prevail.
Lawyers generally have to restrain their habit of trying to
trace every legal principle back to the invention of money as an
instrument of trade. Get to the point.
From a personal standpoint, I prefer 56.1 statements. I find
them very helpful—if done well.
A good 56.1 statement forces the parties to set forth and
address material facts about which there is no dispute. Even if
there is a dispute, there are probably fewer after a 56.1 exercise
than before. So, it is not an idle exercise. And, even if summary
judgment is not granted, the fact that some material facts were
agreed to means that there has been some improvement in
judicial efficiency and economy.
But, if the parties do not contain themselves, the utility of
the 56.1 statement erodes rapidly. Let me give you an example:
A separately numbered paragraph asserts a fact, and in support
of that fact there is a reference to three or four depositions and
an affidavit, none of which support the separately numbered
paragraph, but rather, require a reading of all three or four
depositions, together with the affidavit, and the drawing of an
inference by the court based on circumstantial evidence. You can
imagine what is going to happen here: The game is not worth the
candle. Does the judge really want to become the thirteenth
juror? When you take your depositions, you have to be mindful of
the opportunities for use in a motion for summary judgment or at
trial.
You will recall, I talked about the bias embedded in Rule
12(b) and Rule 56 motions to preserve the right to jury trials.
How does that work in practice, and how does it work in
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antitrust cases? To chart the evolution of this, let us start with
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,22 decided over fifty
years ago. I consider this to be a recent case because it occurred
within my lifetime, although it was before cable.
Poller owned a UHF TV Station in Milwaukee. Columbia
Broadcasting System (“CBS”) exercised its contract right to
cancel Poller’s affiliation agreement. Poller alleged a conspiracy
to drive UHF stations out of business in favor of VHF which CBS
utilized. Pursuant to the conspiracy, CBS acquired another UHF
competitor, converted it to VHF, and left Poller high and dry.
Poller went out of business. Justice Harlan in his dissent—with
Frankfurter, Whittaker and Stewart—described the case as one
of those “not unfamiliar in treble-damage litigation, where injury
resulting from normal business hazards is sought to be made
redressable by casting the affair in antitrust terms.”23 But the
majority was not swayed—most particularly because the district
court had granted CBS’s motion for summary judgment.
The Supreme Court—Clark, Warren, Douglas, Black, and
Brennan—held:
We look at the record on summary judgment in the light most
favorable to Poller, the party opposing the motion, and conclude
here that [summary judgment] should not have been granted.
We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly
in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play
leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged
conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. It is only
when the witnesses are present and subject to crossexamination that their credibility and the weight to be given
their testimony can be appraised. Trial by affidavit is no
substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark
of “even handed justice.”24

You will note the bias in favor of jury trials and the wonders of
cross examination.
A quarter century later, in Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,25another five to four decision, the
Court charted a course 180 degrees from the Poller holding.
Justice Powell, who wrote the majority opinion, was joined by

22
23
24
25

368 U.S. 464 (1962).
Id. at 474 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 473 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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Burger, Rehnquist, Marshall, and O’Connor. Justice Powell was
appointed by Richard Nixon, after a distinguished career
representing major corporate interests. He was open to antitrust
doctrine which promoted efficiency. Mr. Justice White dissented,
joined by Blackmon, Brennan, and Stevens. Justice Brennan
was in the majority in Poller; he was consistent, and so he ended
up with the dissenters in Matsushita.
Plaintiffs in Matsushita alleged that the Japanese electronic
products manufacturers—mostly TV sets—maintained and fixed
continually high prices in Japan, and at the same time fixed and
maintained low prices here in the United States. The Japanese
manufacturers conspired in this way in order to drive American
manufacturers out of business.
At the end of a prolonged period of discovery in which there
was voluminous document production, the district court ordered
the parties to file statements listing all the documents that would
be offered at trial. The judge then found most of the materials
offered by the American manufacturers—the plaintiffs—were
inadmissible.
Further, he found, based on the admissible
evidence, that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to
the existence of a conspiracy, and that any inference of a
conspiracy was unreasonable. Accordingly, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Japanese defendants.
The Third Circuit reversed, finding there was evidence of a
conspiracy. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for
further proceedings. On remand, the Third Circuit entered an
order dismissing the complaint of the American manufacturers.
What happened in the intervening twenty-five years after
Poller? Well, one thing is obvious. With the exception of Mr.
Justice Brennan, it was a new court. And while it was a five to
four decision, you cannot say it was a liberal or conservative
split. In Matsushita, Justice Marshall was in the majority;
Justice Brennan, in the minority. Justice Powell was in the
majority; Justice White, in the minority.
The language of Rule 56 had not changed. It still permitted
summary judgment where there was no genuine issue of material
fact. And, if there were genuine issues, there had to be a trial.
The Matsushita majority recognized that summarizing the facts,
given “this case’s long history” was a “daunting task.” So, rather
than engage in that task which they found to be “unnecessary,”
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the majority analyzed instead the appropriate standard for
reviewing a voluminous record and decided whether summary
judgment should be awarded in an antitrust case.
During the intervening twenty-five years, antitrust law
continued its development. The antitrust cases post-World War
II to the mid-70s were dominated by per se rules. Allegations of
price fixing set off fire alarms, per se. Starting in the mid-70s,
there was a drawing away from the per se approach, and instead
the rule of reason became more prevalent. Courts were called on
to analyze the economic effects of the conduct being evaluated
under the antitrust laws. Courts began to recognize that firms,
even dominant firms, should have considerable freedom to choose
product pricing and new product development. For example,
Kodak’s right even as a putative monopolist to introduce new and
different products.26
And while we are talking about developments on antitrust
law, let me observe that industrial, manufacturing, and
technological developments have a great impact on the
application of antitrust law. In addition to procedure and the
substantive law, you must consider what is happening in the
industry or market you are considering.
I mentioned Kodak. Its monopoly dealt with silver halide
crystals embedded in micro-thin layers of dyes and gelatins
coated on an acetate base—it is better known as film. Film has
been done in by digital photography.
Kodak’s monopoly
evaporated and today it is discussing the possibility of
bankruptcy.
I mentioned Twombly. The Baby Bells had a monopoly on
local service because they controlled the last mile of wiring from
the central office to the customer’s premises. But the Baby Bells
wanted to get into the far more lucrative long distance market
where prices ran up to fifteen cents per minute. This price was
the result of regulatory tinkering in which long distance
subsidized local pricing and business subsidized residential. By
the time that Baby Bells demonstrated that the local markets
were open to competition, the high-priced, long distance market
had disappeared.

26

Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979).
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Cellular technology had developed to the point where it was
approaching a critical mass; it needed one more boost to the
traffic on its network. And here, it was pricing all phone calls the
same whether it was local or long distance. Cellular phones
adopted the bucket of minutes approach; all phone calls—local
and long distance—were priced the same. It boosted phone
traffic so the cellular network was economically viable. And it
forced the local phone companies—the Baby Bells—to follow suit.
The Baby Bells lost out on the long distance market which
motivated its giving up its “last mile” monopoly.
Let me examine another industry, the oil and gas industry.
In the early 80s, the major oil companies went on a binge of
proposed mergers. Why? Well stock prices of oil companies were
falling so that it was actually cheaper to buy a competitive oil
company with proven oil reserves, than it was to spend the
money to find or explore for your own reserves. In other words,
finding oil got to be more expensive than the cost of acquiring a
company in a stock deal. All of the attempts were enjoined under
the antitrust laws. One oil company found its white knight in
DuPont, another in U.S. Steel. What happened next?
Well less than two decades later Exxon and Mobil merged to
form a corporation of unbelievable size—both traced their
beginnings to the Standard Oil Company which was broken up in
1916. And what did Exxon and Mobil have to do? They had to
divest themselves of their retail gas station businesses; that
divestiture was not the lucrative end of the business. Both
companies were glad to be rid of the retail businesses. Indeed
getting rid of those gas stations was the antitrust equivalent of
Brer Rabbit being asked to be thrown into the briar patch.
Let us return now to Matsushita which looked at both
antitrust law and the electronics manufacturing industry.
The majority in Matsushita looked at the American
manufacturers’ allegations and concluded they did not make
much sense from a United States antitrust perspective. First of
all, the alleged conspiracy to keep prices high in Japan was of no
concern to the United States. The United States’ antitrust policy
protected American interests in the United States. Our laws do
not regulate the competitive conditions of other nations’
economies.
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Similarly, a conspiracy to keep prices artificially high would
violate the antitrust laws, but it would not be a source of injury
to the plaintiffs. They would not suffer an antitrust injury.
Indeed, they would gain from the prices set at an artificially high
level.
With respect to low cost predatory pricing, Justice Powell
said that did not make any economic sense. The American
plaintiffs contended that the high profits in Japan put the
Japanese manufacturers in a position where they could price
below market levels in the United States. In order to enjoy any
benefit from below cost pricing, however, these low prices would
have to be sustained until competition was driven out of the
market; and only then could the new found monopolist raise
prices to recoup all that had been lost on the predatory pricing
phase, plus interest. Of course, the American manufacturers also
assumed that no new entity would enter the market to drive
down the recently increased prices. How likely was that? Not
very, especially on the facts of that case where the alleged
conspiratorial behavior had gone on for two decades. Indeed, the
prolonged period suggested there could be no conspiracy.
Justice Powell required the plaintiffs to show more than a
conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws, they had to show
that they had been injured by the illegal conduct. And the injury
had to be an antitrust injury. For example, conspiracy to raise
prices, while illegal, could not have injured the plaintiffs.
To defeat summary judgment, plaintiffs have to do more
than cast a doubt on defendants’ behavior. They have to show
specific facts demonstrating there is a genuine issue for trial.
Given the facts and Justice Powell’s antitrust analysis, the
plaintiffs’ claims were “implausible”—note the word. That is,
they make no economic sense. In these circumstances, plaintiffs
have to make a stronger showing of the need for a trial. After
discovery, you are not entitled to a trial on the hopes that
something will pop up or that counsel will deliver a withering
cross-examination or a devastating summation.
In terms of drawing inferences from the evidence, it is not
possible to infer a conspiracy merely from parallel conduct. The
plaintiffs’ evidence must be compelling enough to exclude the
possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently.
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The Court found that an alleged predatory pricing conspiracy
was inherently speculative. For the conspiracy to be rational, the
conspirators must have a goal of recoupment, or recovery of all
the losses they experienced with below-cost pricing, together with
interest. This is, by definition, an uncertain scheme. The only
sure thing is the loss attributed to the below-cost pricing. And
low-cost pricing by itself might not be sufficient to win in the
market place. The domestic competitors may have deep pockets,
brand loyalty, territorial preferences, which could frustrate lowcost pricing. But, even if the desired monopoly is obtained, it
must be maintained thereafter. Justice Powell said that the
commentators had reached a consensus: Predatory pricing
schemes are rarely tried and, even more rarely, successful.
You should not infer conspiracy when such inferences are
“implausible”—again, note the word. And there is a good reason
not to draw such inferences, it deters pro-competitive conduct.
And the plaintiffs’ complaint dealt with low prices for good
television. That is an antitrust goal—good products sold at
competitive prices.
Cutting prices to increase business is the very essence of
competition. Inferring a conspiracy from low prices chills the
precise conduct the antitrust laws are supposed to protect.
After Matsushita, it is clear that there is no big case, or
Poller-like, restriction on summary judgment in antitrust cases.
Summary judgment is now clearly available.
The same date that the Supreme Court decided Matsushita,
it also decided two other cases: Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.27
and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.28 Cites to Anderson and Celotex are
now standard fare in Rule 56 motions.
Anderson sets “rules of the road” for granting summary
judgment. First, the standard for granting summary judgment
“mirrors” that for determining a directed verdict motion
pursuant to Rule 50—judgment as a matter of law. Second, the
non-moving party cannot defeat a summary judgment motion by
showing a scintilla of evidence in support. Rather, the nonmoving party must show that there is substantial evidence.
Substantial means enough evidence to support a jury verdict.

27
28

477 U.S. 242 (1986).
477 U.S. 317 (1986).
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Third, and finally, if the standard of proof is clear and
convincing, then proof on the motion for summary judgment
must meet that standard.
Celotex picks up where Anderson left off with respect to the
showings that the moving, and non-moving, party must make.
Assuming the moving party does not bear the burden of
persuasion, the moving party can satisfy its burden on the
motion for summary judgment by showing the lack of factual
support for an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim.
If the moving party’s burden is met, the non-moving party must
introduce specific facts supporting its claim. Failure to do so
means that the moving party prevails.
We know now that summary judgment is as appropriate in
antitrust cases as it is in any other case. A recent antitrust case
in the Second Circuit decided in August 2011 shows you how
commonplace summary judgment has become.
The City of New York sued GHI and HIP over their proposed
merger claiming that the combined entity would wield too much
power over prices in the healthcare insurance market. The
Second Circuit did not bother citing to Matsushita, Anderson, or
Celotex. It got right down to business. The City had to allege a
“plausible,” “relevant” market. Of course, the relevant market
must be defined as a necessary predicate to determine if the
merger of the two insurers would substantially lessen
competition.
The market has to include all the products
reasonably interchangeable by consumers.
The City failed to do that. Instead, it defined a market based
on the two insurers it chose to do business with. A single
purchaser’s preference, however, does not define a market, the
court held.
The interesting issue in this case was the court’s refusal to
permit the City to amend. The court held, correctly in my view,
that it was too late.
Remember, with motions to dismiss, it is not unusual to
allow for a new pleading. But here, the City moved to enjoin the
merger, and the Judge who denied the application pointed out
the flaw in the City’s market definition. The City did not
attempt to amend until after the motion for summary judgment
was made. This points out, again, the difference between a
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motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. The run
up to a motion for summary judgment may take longer, but the
result is more final and complete.
Let me close with some advice on what you should not do and
what you should do when you are contemplating a summary
judgment motion.
First, do not overburden the court. I think the one thing I
dread most is the lawyer who writes in and says: “This matter is
too complicated. Give me leave to file fifty pages.” I interpret
this to mean “Judge, you are a dim bulb; I will enlighten you, but
given your limitations, it will take me longer than twenty-five
pages.”
Second, don’t rely on the pleadings. As I tried to explain,
usually the summary judgment motion is long past the time for
testing the adequacy of the pleadings. You must recognize you
are dealing with a different portion of the rule book.
Third, do not just quote the rules. And it does not do much
to complain that the rules have been violated. For example, I
was supposed to get the papers on Monday, but he didn’t serve
them until Tuesday at 9:00 a.m., or the type size was wrong.
What the court needs is analyses of how the law applies to these
facts to yield a rational, legally defensible result. So, what
should you do?
First, be specific, precise, and concise. The shorter and more
pointed your brief is, the better off you will be. If you have a
weak spot do not bury it. Address it. Candor counts; it lends
judicial confidence to the quality of your advocacy. A district
judge may very well think, how is this going to look on appeal;
can this advocate protect the correct decision I want to make?
Second, spend time identifying the big facts and applicable
law. Marshal all the evidence. Make sure the references are
clear, precise, and correct.
Third, be prepared to take advantage of the motion process
even if you do not prevail. Remember, that a denial can have a
silver lining. Perhaps the court specifies the legal standard it
will apply and what the proof requirements are to meet that
standard. It certainly creates the law of the case. It may resolve
certain facts which will expedite the trial. Sometimes, even if a
motion for summary judgment is only granted in part, there is
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little left to try, and the parties may settle. You may be able to
use the decision to file in limine motions before trial and Rule 50
motions after trial.
I hope I have answered some of your questions and given you
an overview of some of the strategies and basic concerns about
making a motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case.
You should not be hesitant about doing so. But you should be
prepared to invest the time, effort, and brain power to take
maximum advantage of the opportunity.
Remember that you are one of three hundred civil cases, plus
fifty criminal cases. The judge is busy. He or she will appreciate
your good efforts to boil it all down so that the issue may be
properly addressed.

